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COGNITIVE LABOUR
Abstract. Project selection by funding bodies directly influences
the division of cognitive labour in scientific communities. I present
a novel adaptation of an existing agent-based model of scientific
research, in which a central funding body selects from proposed
projects located on an epistemic landscape. I simulate four differ-
ent selection strategies: selection based on a god’s-eye perspective
of project significance, selection based on past success, selection
based on past funding, and random selection. Results show the size
of the landscape matters: on small landscapes historical informa-
tion leads to slightly better results than random selection, but on
large landscapes random selection greatly outperforms historically-
informed selection.
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Introduction
National funding bodies support much of contemporary science. The
selection criteria for funding have gained increasing attention within
philosophy of science (Gillies, 2008; O’Malley et al., 2009; Haufe, 2013;
Lee, 2015). Meanwhile, there has been growing interest in model-based
approaches to understanding the social epistemic activities of scientists
(Kitcher, 1990; Strevens, 2003; Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009; Grim,
2009; Zollman, 2010). The current paper builds on previous modelling
tools to explore the effects of centralised selection mechanisms on the
division of cognitive labour and the ability of scientific communities to
efficiently discover significant truths.
Science aims at discovering significant truths, i.e. not just any truths,
but truths that will eventually contribute in a meaningful way to well-
being (Kitcher, 2001). This is the justification for the public support
of science, including basic science (Bush, 1945). Some funding termi-
nology: scientific projects have high impact (ex post) if they result
in significant truths; projects have high merit (ex ante) if they are
predicted to have high impact.
Polanyi (1962) analysed merit as being composed of three compo-
nents: scientific value, plausibility and originality. Polanyi notes an
essential tension between plausibility and originality: the more original
a project, the more difficult it is to evaluate its plausibility. Polanyi ad-
vocates selection by peer review as a conformist position, that sacrifices
the occasional meritorious original project while ensuring all supported
research projects are plausible, to “prevent the adulteration of science
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by cranks and dabblers” (p. 8). Gillies (2008, 2014) takes an oppos-
ing position, arguing that the cost of losing (infrequent) highly original
and meritorious research is much greater than the cost of occasion-
ally supporting implausible research that ends up being of low impact.
As an alternative to peer review, Gillies advocates random selection.
The tension between plausibility and originality is clearly relevant to
questions of effective division of cognitive labour, and has direct links
to science policy. This tension, and its complexity, is explored in this
paper.
I will argue that the results of the simulations presented are both sig-
nificant and surprising. The simulations show that, under reasonable
parameter values for at least some fields of science, choosing projects
at random performs significantly better, in terms of accumulated sig-
nificant truths, compared to other funding strategies, including project
selection by peer review. The results support, to an extent, Gillies’
proposal of funding by lottery.
1. Model description
The model explores the influence of different funding mechanisms on
the accumulation of significant truths. It builds on the epistemic land-
scape model developed by Weisberg and Muldoon (2009), extending it
by adding representations of centralised funding selection and dynamic
changes in project merit. The latter is added to reflect a more realistic
picture of scientific merit. For example, Strevens (2003) discusses the
effect of a successful discovery on all further pursuits of the same ques-
tion: they no longer have any merit, as they lose all originality. Several
dynamic processes affecting merit are detailed later in the paper.
The model represents a population of scientists exploring a topic of
scientific interest. They are all funded by the same central funding
body to pursue projects of varying duration, measured in years. Each
project’s significance is allocated in advance by the modeller, from a
“god’s-eye” perspective. When grants end scientists successfully com-
plete their project. Their projects’ results contribute to the collection
of significant truths in the field’s corpus of knowledge. Funding mech-
anisms are compared by their ability to generate this accumulation of
significant truths.
For simplicity, scientists in the model (unrealistically) do not share
their findings nor explore similar projects during research. They only
work on the project for which they were funded and they only share
their results at the end of a grant. The social processes set aside here
have been explored in previous works (Grim, 2009; Zollman, 2010).
Future work may combine the different models towards a unified picture
of the division of cognitive labour.
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Funding is represented as a process of selection. In every time step,
the scientists whose grants have run out are placed in a pool of candi-
dates along with new entrants to the field, and the modelled funding
mechanism selects from this pool of candidates those who will receive
funding and carry out research projects. Modelled funding mechanisms
differ in the way they select individuals, as outlined below.
Actual potential: Actual potential, which can only be known from
a god’s-eye perspective, is the significance of a project’s re-
sults were it successfully completed today. In the absence of
time-dependant merit, actual potential is simply the signifi-
cance of the project’s results. However, in the presence of time-
dependence the significance could change between the initiation
of the project (at the point of funding) and its completion (at
the point of contributing the results to the relevant corpus).
This means that in the presence of time-dependence, actual
potential might diverge from the eventual contribution of the
project.
Estimated potential: Estimated potential is the scientific commu-
nity’s ex ante evaluation (assumed, for simplicity, to be single-
valued) of the merit of a proposed project. This prediction is
taken to rely on the known contributions of past projects which
bear some similarity to the proposed project, and so depends
on the history of research projects in the field. In representing
decisions based on the research community’s prediction, this
selection method is akin to peer-review.
Past funding: Under this mechanism, funding is allocated to those
scientists who already received funding in the past, and only
to them. The model (unrealistically) represents all scientists as
being of equal skill, and so this mechanism cannot be taken to
mean the selection of the most “intrinsically able” scientists.
Rather, this mechanism is included as a “most conservative”
option, not admitting any new researchers to the field beyond
the field’s original investigators.
Lottery: Under a lottery, all candidates have equal chances of being
funded. The lottery option serves both as a natural bench-
mark for other funding methods, and as a representation of the
mechanism proposed by Gillies (2014).
The essence of the model is the comparison of the performance of these
selection mechanisms in generating results of high significance over time
under various conditions.
To represent in the model the time-dependence of merit, the signif-
icance contributions of different project results are allowed to change
over time as a response to scientists’ actions. Three dynamic processes
are included in the model (details in §2.5). Two processes involve a re-
duction of significance following a successful project or breakthrough,
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which reflects the one-off nature of discovery. The third process involves
an increase in significance when a new avenue of research is opened by
a significant discovery. Simulations based on the model show that these
dynamic processes have a significant effect on the relative performance
of different funding strategies.
2. Simulation details
2.1. Simulating the epistemic landscape. To investigate the com-
plex nature of the domain being modelled, the model was turned into a
computer simulation.1 The basic structure of the landscape simulation
follows Weisberg and Muldoon’s, of a two-dimensional configuration
space, charted with two coordinates x and y, with an associated scalar
field represented in a third dimension as height along the z axis. Each
(x, y) coordinate pair specifies a different potential research project;
the closer two projects are on the landscape, the more similar they are.
The scalar value associated to the coordinate represents the significance
of the result obtained on a successful completion of the project, were
it completed today (allowing for time dependence). The limit to two
spatial dimensions of variation between projects is likely to be unreal-
istic (Wilkins, 2008), but a higher-dimensional alternative would make
the model much less tractable.
In each run of the simulation, the landscape is generated anew in the
following process:
(1) Initialise a flat surface of the required dimensions.
(2) Choose a random location on the surface.
(3) Pick random values for relative height, width along x, and width
along y.
(4) Add to the landscape a hill at the location chosen in step 2
by using a bivariate Gaussian distribution with the parameters
picked in step 3.
(5) Repeat steps 2-4 until the specified number of hills is reached.
(6) Scale up linearly the height of the landscape according to the
specified maximum height.
This process generates the “god’s-eye” perspective of the research po-
tential of the domain. Here and later, random variables are used to
fill-in parameters whose existence is essential for the simulation, but
where (1) the specific values they take can vary across a range of valid
model targets, and/or (2) there is no compelling empirical evidence to
choose a particular value. This requires, however, several runs of the
simulation for each configuration, to average out the effects of random
variation.
1Source code for the simulation is available from the author on request.
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2.2. Simulating agents. The agents in the model represent scientists
investigating the epistemic landscape. Each agent represents an inde-
pendent researcher or group, and is characterised by its location on the
landscape, representing the project they are currently pursuing, and
a countdown counter, representing the time remaining until their cur-
rent project is finished. Like Weisberg and Muldoon’s “hill climbers”,
agents are simulated as local maximisers. Agents follow the following
strategy every simulation step:
(1) Reduce countdown by 1.
(2) If countdown is not zero: remain in same location.
(3) If countdown is zero: contribute to the accumulated significance
the significance of the current location, and attempt to move to
the highest local neighbour.
In the simulation, the agents are identical, in the sense that any
agent, when successfully completing a project of a given significance,
will contribute exactly that amount to the accumulated significance
of the field. This simplification ignores natural ability and gained ex-
perience, and stems from a focus on a particular approach to science
funding, which funds projects, rather than funding people. The focus
is informed by the explicit policies of certain funding bodies, like the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), reflected, for example, in the in-
stitution of blind peer review. Thus, the results of the current work
would not extend to the minority of science funding bodies, such as
the Wellcome Trust, that make explicit their preference to fund people
rather than projects.
The local neighbourhood of an agent is defined as the 3 × 3 square
centred on their current position. The attempt to move to the highest
neighbour depends on the selection (funding) mechanism, as discussed
below. The accumulated significance, which is the sum of all individ-
ual contributions to significance, is stored as a global variable of the
simulation and used to compare strategies.
In the beginning of the simulation, a specified number of agents are
seeded in random locations on the landscape, with randomly generated
countdowns selected from a specified range of values. An example of
an initial seeding of agents can be seen in Fig. 1.
In the absence of selection and time-dependence, the course of the
simulation is easy to describe: agents begin in random locations on a
random landscape, and as the simulation progresses the agents finish
projects and climb local hills, until, after an amount of time which de-
pends on the size of the landscape, the number and size of peaks, and
the duration of grants, all agents trace a path to their local maxima
and stay there. Since agents increase their local significance during the
climb, the rate of significance accumulation increases initially, until
all agents reach their local maxima, at which point significance con-
tinues accumulating at a fixed rate indefinitely. This is the dynamic
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Figure 1. Landscape simulation with initial seeding of
agents. Each number on the landscape represents an
agent at its location, with the value of the number rep-
resenting the agent’s countdown. The colours indicate
the height (significance) of each position (project) in the
landscape.
seen in Weisberg and Muldoon’s simulation for a pure community of
“hill climbers”, and its unrealistic nature highlights the importance of
simulating the time-dependence of significance.
2.3. Simulating communal knowledge. In addition to their con-
tribution to significance, agents also contribute to the visibility of the
landscape (Muldoon and Weisberg, 2011). The visibility of a project
represents whether the scientific community, and especially funding
bodies, can estimate the significance contribution of that project. Ini-
tially, the entire landscape is invisible, representing full uncertainty.
Upon initial seeding of agents, each agent contributes vision of their lo-
cal neighbourhood, as defined above, to the total vision. As the agents
move, they add vision of their new local neighbourhood. Visibility is
used in the best visible funding mechanism described below.
The simulation represents visibility in a simplistic manner by assign-
ing binary values: either the community knows what the significance
of a project will be, or it does not. A more realistic representation will
allow partial visibility, with some distance decay effect, such that the
community would still be able to make predictions of significance for
less familiar projects, but these predictions will have a probability of
being wrong, with the probability of error increasing the more unfamil-
iar these projects are. This addition, however, will be computationally
heavy, as it requires maintaining multiple versions of the landscape,
both for the real values and for the estimated values.
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2.4. Simulating funding strategies. The aim of the model is to
explore the effects of funding mechanisms on the population and dis-
tribution of investigators. Since the aim is to simulate current fund-
ing practices (albeit in a highly idealised manner), and since current
funding practices operate in passive mode (choosing from proposals
originating from scientists rather than dictating which projects aught
be pursued), the guiding principle of the simulation is that a funding
mechanism is akin to a selection process: at each step of the simula-
tion, the actual population of agents is a subset of the candidate or
potential population, where inclusion in the actual population follows
a certain selection mechanism.
Funding mechanisms are simulated in the following manner:
Every step:
(1) Place all agents with zero countdown in a pool of “old candi-
dates”.
(2) Generate a set of new candidate agents, in a process identical
to the seeding of agents in the beginning of the simulation.
(3) Select from the joint pool of (old candidates + new candidates)
a subset according to the selection mechanism specified by the
funding method.
(4) Only selected agents are placed on the landscape and take part
in the remainder of the simulation, the rest are ignored.
The simulation can represent four different funding mechanisms:
best: selects the candidates which are located at the highest points,
regardless of the visibility of their locations. This simulates a
mechanism which selects the most promising projects from a
god’s eye perspective. This overly optimistic mechanism does
not represent a real funding strategy. Rather, it serves as an
ideal benchmark against which realistic funding mechanisms are
measured.
best visible: filters out candidates which are located at invisible loca-
tions, i.e. candidates who propose to work on projects which are
too different from present or past projects. It then selects the
candidates in the highest locations from the remainder. This
strategy is closer to a realistic representation of selection by peer
review. Note that even this version is epistemically optimistic,
as it assumes the selection panel has successfully gathered all
available information from all the different agents, both past
and present.
lotto: selects candidates at random from the candidate pool, disre-
garding the visibility and height of their locations.
oldboys: represents no selection: old candidates continue, no new can-
didates are generated.
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The key parameters for all funding mechanisms are the size of the
candidate pool and the size of the selection pool. The size of the can-
didate pool, which in turn depends on the size of the new candidate
pool (as the size of the old candidate pool emerges from the simula-
tion), has been chosen in the simulations such that the total candidate
pool is equal in size to the initial number of agents (except oldboys
where there are no new candidates). This means the success probabil-
ity changes between funding rounds, around a mean which is equal to
1/(average countdown). With an average grant duration of five years,
this yields a success rate of 20%, close to the real value in many contem-
porary funding schemes (NIH, 2014). The number of grants awarded
each year is set to equal the number of grants completed each year,
maintaining a fixed size for the population of investigators.
For simplicity, the simulated funding mechanisms do not take into
account the positions of existing agents on the landscape, except indi-
rectly when considering their vision. Future simulations may consider
a selection mechanism which explicitly favours either diversity or ag-
glomeration, though one expects difficulties in operationalisation and
measurement of epistemic diversity.
2.5. Simulating merit dynamics. To make the simulation more re-
alistic, the significance of projects is allowed to change over time in re-
sponse to research activities of the community of investigators. Three
such dynamic processes are included in the simulation:
Winner takes it all: As was made explicit by Strevens (2003), the
utility gain of discovery is a one-off event: the first (recognised)
discovery of X may greatly contribute to the collective utility,
but there is little or no contribution from further discoveries of
X. In the simulation, this is represented by setting the signifi-
cance of a location to zero whenever an agent at that location
has finished their project and made their contribution to ac-
cumulated significance. This effect is triggered whenever any
countdown reaches zero, which makes it quite common, but it
has a very localised effect, only affecting the significance of a
single project.
Reduced novelty: When a researcher makes a significant discovery,
simulated by finishing a project with associated significance
above a certain threshold, the novelty of nearby projects is
reduced, which in the model is simulated by a reduction of
significance in a local area around the discovery.
New avenues: When a researcher makes a significant discovery, it
opens up the possibility of new avenues of research, simulated
in the model by the appearance of a new randomly-shaped hill
at a random location on the landscape.
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3. Results and discussion
Here I present the results of simulations of different setups of interest,
exploring the relative success of different funding mechanisms under
different conditions.
All simulation results show a comparison between the four fund-
ing mechanisms, as a plot of total accumulated significance (arbitrary
units) at the end of the simulation run, averaged over five runs with dif-
ferent random seeds. In all simulations the range of countdowns was 2
to 7. The number of individuals was set to equal (size of landscape)3/4.
Simulations were ran for 50 steps. The trigger for significance-dependant
processes was 0.7 of the global maximum. Results are shown for a small
landscape (50× 50) in Fig. 2 and for a large landscape (500× 500) in
Fig. 3.
Figure 2. Comparison of significance accumulation un-
der different funding mechanisms, small landscape (50×
50).
To get a feeling for how the community is affected by the funding
mechanism, I present visualisations of the state of the landscape at the
end of the simulation run for the two funding mechanisms mentioned
in the introduction (best visible and lotto) in Fig. 4. Note that due to
the winner takes it all dynamic process it is possible to “see” the past
trajectory of exploration, as completed projects leave behind highly
localised points of zero (remaining) significance. This allows for a visual
representation of the division of cognitive labour that emerges under
different funding schemes.
As is clear from the simulations, the best funding mechanism is in-
deed best at accumulating significance over time, though with various
lead margins over the second best strategy. In the presence of dynamic
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Figure 3. Comparison of significance accumulation un-
der different funding mechanisms, large landscape (500×
500).
(a) best visible (b) lotto
Figure 4. Landscape visualisation at the end of the
simulation run under different funding mechanisms.
processes, best is in the best position to locate new avenues for re-
search, wherever they show up. However, as mentioned above, the best
funding strategy is not realisable, as it requires a god’s eye view of the
epistemic landscape.
On the small landscape the three strategies, best visible, oldboys,
and lotto perform roughly similarly, with lotto at a small disadvantage
as it cannot make use of valuable information from past successes. It
seems counter-intuitive that best visible performs worse than oldboys. A
possible explanation is the effect of reduced novelty: best visible tends
to cluster scientists around the most promising projects, and so when
one makes a breakthrough it reduces the significance of contributions
for all groups working on similar projects (the phenomenon known in
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contemporary science as “scooping”). This excessive clustering around
fashions is not present in oldboys or lotto.
On the large landscape lotto greatly outperforms best visible and
oldboys. This is because new avenues on a large landscape are likely to
spawn outside the visibility of the agents, where lotto can access them
but the other two strategies cannot. In the smaller landscape this
effect is not apparent, as the relative visibility is larger, and therefore
the chance of a new avenue appearing within the visible area is larger.
Conclusion
This paper presented a way to extend existing epistemic landscape
models so that they can represent selection by a central funding body
and time dependence of significance. This model was used in computer
simulations to compare the effectiveness of different idealised versions
of selection criteria, most notably selection based on past successes
(akin to peer review), random selection and no selection. The most
significant result from the simulation was that on a large landscape,
when a topic can be explored in many ways that could be very different
from each other, random selection performs much better than selection
based on past performance.
This result fits in with a general result from the body of works on
agent-based models of scientific communities, that shows diversity in
the community trumps individual pursuit of excellence as a way of
making communal epistemic progress. The tension of science funding,
between originality and plausibility, is thus a part of the broader tension
between diversity and excellence, between exploration and exploitation.
Previous social epistemology models have focused on the role of inter-
nal factors in shifting the balance between exploration and exploita-
tion. Kitcher (1990); Strevens (2003) look at reward structures (of
internal credit, not external monetary rewards) and individual motiva-
tion towards credit or truth. Grim (2009); Zollman (2010) look at in-
formation availability and information transfer between scientists, and
at individual beliefs. Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) look at individual
researchers’ social strategy: follower or maverick.
The current work is the first within this modelling lineage to look at
the effects of an external, institutional factor: selection by a centralised
funding body. The current paper brings this line of research closer to
having a direct relevance to science policy. Hopefully future work in
this vain will continue this trend, to deliver on the challenge set out by
Kitcher (1990, p. 22):
How do we best design social institutions for the ad-
vancement of learning? The philosophers have ignored
the social structure of science. The point, however, is to
change it.
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We could start by advocating for funding mechanisms that allow for
more exploration.
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